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Abstract
We study how the closeness of electoral race aﬀect the number of invalid ballots
under the traditional paper-ballot voting technology. Using a large dataset from the
Italian parliamentary elections in 1994-2001, we ﬁnd a strong positive correlation
between the closeness of electoral race and the fraction of invalid ballots. This
correlation is not driven by voters’ behavior, the biased actions of election oﬃcers,
or the strategic pressure by parties. The theory that garners most support is that of
unbiased election oﬃcers that increase their eﬀort in response to higher (expected)
closeness of electoral race, so as to reduce the likelihood of incorrectly adjudicating
the victory. We also ﬁnd large North-South diﬀerences in the patterns of invalid
ballots: (i) electoral districts and municipalities in Southern Italian regions have
a substantially higher level of invalid ballots, and (ii) the correlation between the
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The performance of diﬀerent voting technologies has been a key question in political
science at least since the beginning of the 20th century (the earliest paper is Allen 1906;
a brief review of the early research on voting technologies in Herrnson et al. 2005). The
amount of scholarly contributions on this issue increased rapidly at the aftermath of the
highly disputed outcome of 2000 Presidential elections in the United States, which was
decided by a small number of votes in Florida, as well as vote count inconsistencies in sev-
eral counties (see Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project 2001, Knack and Kropf 2003,
Ansolabehere and Stewart III 2005, Shue and Luttmer 2009, and references therein). The
importance of understanding the performance of diﬀerent voting technologies goes far be-
yond a particular election. Poorly functioning electoral institutions reduce the possibility
of the electorate to express its political preferences and undermine citizens’ trust in the
democratic system. As Ansolabehere and Stewart III (2005) write, ”Disputed elections
can lower the perceived legitimacy of democratic elections, and some technologies might
make it more likely to have disputed elections” (Ansolabehere and Stewart III, 2005, pg.
365).
In this paper, we study the traditional hand-counted paper-ballot voting technology.
We concentrate on one feature: the number of invalid ballots, and how this number varies
with the closeness of electoral race. We discuss several competing theories that generate
testable predictions on this relationship. Using the data from the Italian parliamentary
elections in 1994-2001, we ﬁnd that the fraction of invalid ballots is strongly positively
correlated with the closeness of electoral race. We ﬁnd no evidence that this correlation is
driven by voters’ behavior, the biased actions of election oﬃcers (i.e. fraud), or the strate-
gic pressure by parties. The theory that garners most support is that of unbiased election
oﬃcers that increase their eﬀort in response to higher (expected) closeness of electoral
race, so as to reduce the likelihood of incorrectly adjudicating the victory. In other words,
the traditional paper-based system seems to have an ’automatic safety control’ that (at
least to some extent) guarantees that the victor is announced correctly. However, this
’safety control’ works only in the areas with suﬃciently high levels of social capital.
Our ﬁndings have two important implications. First, provided that the level of social
capital is suﬃciently high, under the traditional paper-ballot system the election oﬃcers
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is narrower. This feature has the advantage of the ‘automatic correction’, which is absent
under the machine-based voting technologies. Second, social capital plays a role not
only for the active and responsible participation of voters and the disciplined behavior of
politicians and public oﬃcials, but also for the behavior of other actors in the political
system, such as election oﬃcers.
The literature on voting technologies can be divided into three strands. The ﬁrst
group of papers compares diﬀerent voting technologies (punch cards, optical scanning,
direct register electronic machines, etc.).
A seminal contribution in this group is Ansolabehere and Stewart III (2005). Using a
county-level panel data for the United States elections from 1988 to 2000, the authors ﬁnd
that voting equipment/technology has a signiﬁcant and sizeable eﬀect on the number of
”residual” votes (i.e. blank and invalid ballots). In particular, they ﬁnd that the elections
with traditional paper-based hand-counted ballots and optically scanned paper ballots
exhibit the lowest number of residual votes, whereas the elections with direct register
electronic machines and punch cards have the highest number of residual votes. This
ﬁnding indicates that the conventional wisdom that the electronic equipment that is free
from human-based vote counting that is subject to fatigue is actually wrong: this fatigue
is counterbalanced by the higher reliability of manual vote counting.
Shue and Luttmer (2009) use the data from the 2003 California Recall Election to
study the eﬀect of adjacency (of the name of a minor candidate to that of a major one)
on misvotes, i.e. the mistaken votes for the minor candidate. They ﬁnd that the vote
shares of minor candidates double when their names are adjacent to those of a major
candidate. Moreover, this eﬀect increases in precincts with more Democratic, Hispanic,
low-income, non-English speaking, low-education, and young voters, and a major can-
didate whose voter base includes more voters from these categories faces a systematic
electoral disadvantage. This literature, however, does not look at the behavioral eﬀects
and the cost-beneﬁt calculations that is present in the manual vote counting, and how
these might be related to the characteristics of the electoral race (in particular, closeness
of the election).
The second strand of literature studies various forms of vote buying (see the collection
of papers in Schaﬀer 2007). For instance, in a very interesting study of Chilean elections
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in 1958 has eﬀectively destroyed the “market” for votes that existed between landed
aristocracy and agricultural workers, thus sharply decreasing the votes for the right-wing
parties.
Finally, the third strand of literature studies ballot rigging (a good survey is Lehoucq
2003). Herron and Johnson (2003) look at the 2002 parliamentary elections in Ukraine.
They exploit the fact that Ukraine has a mixed electoral system: in some precincts, the
electoral system is proportional representation (PR), whereas in others it is single-member
district (SMD). This diﬀerence creates diﬀerent incentives for the incumbent political
party to engage in ballot rigging, and the authors ﬁnd that the data support this theory.
Lehoucq and Molina (2002) study the accusation of ballot-rigging ﬁled in Costa Rica, and
ﬁnd that such accusations where much higher in close-race districts. Note, however, that
this ﬁnding does not necessarily imply that fraud is more frequent in close-race districts
(‘supply’ side): it might as well be that, for equal number of rigged ballots, there are
higher incentives for parties to ﬁle an accusation of ballot-rigging in close-race districts.
There are very few papers that explicitly study invalid ballots. Power and Garand
(2007) analyze, using an aggregate-level panel-data analysis from 80 legislative elections
held in 18 Latin American democracies between 1980 and 2000, the inﬂuence of three
sets of factors on the number of invalid ballots: socio-demographic (literacy, education,
wealth), institutional (electoral system and ballot structure), and political (alienation
and protest). They ﬁnd some support for all the three sets of factors: socio-economic
factors (urbanization and income inequality) correlate with the number of invalid votes,
institutional factors (compulsory voting, electoral disproportionality, and the combina-
tion of high district magnitude with personalized voting) increase the number of blank
and spoiled ballots, whereas political factors such as political violence and the level and
direction of democratic change also correlate with the fraction of invalid votes.
On the social-capital side, there is some literature studying the relationship between
social capital measures and political behavior (a nice general survey of recent research
on social capital is Sobel 2002). The works most closely related to our study are those
that look at the political dimension of social capital in Italy. Putnam (1993) is a seminal
study which ﬁnds that the measures of social capital across Italian regions are correlated
with the experience of city-state self-governance in the Medieval times. Nannicini et al.
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on the members of Italian Parliament between 1948 and 2001. They ﬁnd that in districts
with higher social capital, voters punish the misbehavior of politicians more severely. As
a consequence, the episodes of misbehavior by politicians occur less frequently in districts
with higher social capital.
1 Invalid Ballots: What Are They?
In any election, all ballots casted by voters belong to one of the three categories: valid,
blank, or invalid (or spoilt). Typically, after the vote count is completed, the election
administration reports the number of ballots belonging each category. A ballot is con-
sidered invalid if the voter’s preference is not clearly stated (this includes, for instance,
over-voting, i.e. casting more than one preference when only one preference is allowed) or
the vote’s secrecy is undermined (e.g. signing the ballot). The duty of an election oﬃcer
is to invalidate any ballot on which the voter has drawn a sign which is diﬀerent from a
simple cross and any ballot on which a cross does not uniquely identify the voter’s pref-
erence. These rules apply to most, if not all, democratic elections. The stated objective
of this procedure is to avoid antidemocratic and illegal voting behavior.
The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, which maintains a database
on parliamentary and presidential elections across most countries in the world, reports
that the fraction of invalid votes for their entire dataset (which covers approximately 100
countries over the last 10 years) is around 3 percent. However, looking across countries
(see Figure 1), we see large variation in this measure. In all the developed countries
the fraction of invalid ballots is a single-digit number, typically below 5 percent. The
number is much higher for the developing countries, with double-digit numbers in several
developing countries, in particular in Latin America and Western Africa.
2 Competing Theories
If the number of invalid ballots is not driven by entirely random and idiosyncratic factors
(e.g. distraction of individual voters or election oﬃcers), what are the potential causes
that can inﬂuence their number relative to the total number of votes casted in an election?
Below we describe diﬀerent competing theories of invalid ballots in a two-party election.
5The empirical predictions of these models diﬀer substantially, and our empirical analysis
will be able to verify which of these theories is supported by the data from the Italian
legislative elections between 1994 and 2001.
2.1 Voters
The ﬁrst theory that can explain the variation in the fraction of invalid ballots is that
of the rational behavior of voters. We will thus consider a simple cost-beneﬁt analysis of
individual voter’s decision. Suppose that ﬁlling out the ballot requires some concentration,
and ﬁlling it out correctly has some attention cost. Moreover, suppose that the probability
of making a mistake (and, therefore, submitting an invalid ballot) decreases with the
attention allocated by the voter.
Next, consider the beneﬁt side. If the voter prefers one candidate over the other,
she might perceive a beneﬁt from feeling that her vote helped to increase the chances
of victory of her preferred candidate. This might be justiﬁed by either the fact that a
voter considers her probability of being pivotal (see Ch. 14 in Mueller 2003), or - more
realistically - by the fact that the voter might feel the moral duty to ”do her part” in
helping her preferred party to win (as in the models by Feddersen and Sandroni 2006b,a).
The higher is the expected margin of victory of one of the candidates in the district,
the lower is the voter’s expected beneﬁt of casting a valid vote. Given that the margin of
victory does not aﬀect the cost side, the higher is the margin, the lower is the attention
that the voter devotes to casting a valid vote, and thus the higher is the probability of
submitting an invalid ballot.
We thus obtain the following simple hypothesis:
Hypothesis V. Higher margin of victory is positively correlated with the fraction of
invalid ballots.
2.2 Protest
A related (but motivationally diﬀerent) theory is that of voter protest. Voters might
have feelings about the choice that they are facing, and may act in the voting booth
in reaction to these feelings. For instance, Brighenti (2003) analyzes a selection of in-
valid ballots in a regional election in Italy, and ﬁnds that a part of the invalid ballots
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lots. These are examples of voluntary invalidation.
If the expected margin of victory is suﬃciently large, some of the voters that sup-
port the losing candidate might feel that, de facto, their electoral choice is severely
constrained. If this triggers negative emotions in them, some of the voters might vol-
untarily invalidate their ballots. Another related possibility is that of expressive voting
(Brennan and Lomasky, 1993; Schuessler, 2000). If voters want to express their general
discontent about the political system, they might want to cast an invalid ballot as a
protest. At the same time, each voter might have a political preference for some party.
The closer is the electoral race, the higher is the opportunity cost of invalidating the
ballot to express one’s discontent. In both cases, we should observe a positive correlation
between the margin of victory and the fraction of invalid ballots.
Hypothesis VP1. Higher margin of victory is positively correlated with the fraction
of invalid ballots.
Some of the voters might express their feelings by leaving their ballots blank. Then,
the fraction of invalid ballots and that of blank ballots should be correlated. Based on
this intuition, we will use the fraction of blank ballots as a regressor, and this should allow
us to partially capture the voter protest.
Moreover, if voters invalidate their ballots voluntarily in reaction to the perceived lack
of electoral choice, a higher number of candidates should mitigate this perceived lack and
thus be negatively correlated with the fraction of invalid ballots.
Hypothesis VP2. Higher number of candidates is negatively correlated with the
fraction of invalid ballots.
2.3 Unbiased election oﬃcers
Another possibility is that election oﬃcers act rationally. Let’s consider ﬁrst the case in
which an oﬃcer does not prefer one candidate over the other. The problem of the oﬃcer
can be then as follows.1
Suppose that each oﬃcer considers all the ballots that have to be counted one by
one. Each ballot that he scrutinizes can be either valid or invalid. The objective of
the unbiased election oﬃcer is to minimize the likelihood that the victory is incorrectly
1In the Appendix, we present a formal model, the intuition for which we describe in this sub-section.
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election oﬃcers might make mistakes. There are two types of error that the oﬃcer might
commit. Type I error consists in invalidating a truly valid ballot. Type II error consists
in counting as valid a ballot which is in reality invalid. Given that the type I error is
very unlikely to happen (one can hardly spot a non-existent irregularity in a ballot which
has been correctly ﬁlled by the voter), let’s assume such errors away. Instead, the type II
error - missing an existing irregularity - is much more important. Moreover, the likelihood
of this error is aﬀected by the eﬀort that the oﬃcer exerts. These type-II errors might
jeopardize the true outcome of the elections if they are suﬃciently numerous as compared
to the diﬀerence in the number of valid votes between the two candidates.2
In other words, the oﬃcer exerts the eﬀort of attention to minimizes the number of
type-II errors. However, the eﬀort is costly, and the higher is the number of ballots to
scrutinize, the higher is the incremental cost of eﬀort. On the other hand, the risk of
jeopardizing the election outcome depends on the expected margin of victory: the higher
is this margin, the less it is likely that a given number of type-II errors inﬂuence the
election outcome.
The rational oﬃcer chooses the level of eﬀort that equates the incremental cost of
eﬀort to its incremental beneﬁt. If the expected margin of victory increases, the beneﬁt
of eﬀort falls, and thus the oﬃcer puts lower eﬀort. This, in turn, implies a lower number
of truly invalid ballots that are counted as invalid. We thus obtain the following
Hypothesis U1. Higher margin of victory is negatively correlated with the fraction
of invalid ballots.
Let’s now consider the eﬀect of a variation in turnout. Given that the number of
election oﬃcers is ﬁxed (i.e. it is not adjusted on the basis of turnout), a higher number
of voters showing up at the polls implies a higher number of ballots that each oﬃcer has
to scrutinize. This means (under the standard convexity assumption on the cost function)
that the incremental cost of eﬀort increases. The oﬃcer then ﬁnds it optimal to reduce
the eﬀort that she puts in scrutinizing the ballots, which, in turn, leads to a lower fraction
of invalid ballots. We can thus formulate the following
2This implicitly assumes that the election oﬃcer acts taking into account the worst-case scenario: that,
if let pass, all the invalid ballots are counted as votes for the same candidate. While this assumption is
clearly unrealistic in its pure form, our reasoning remain valid as far as the election oﬃcer considers as
possible a scenario suﬃciently close to the worst case.
8Hypothesis U2. Higher turnout is negatively correlated with the fraction of invalid
ballots.
2.4 Biased election oﬃcers
Now consider the case of an election oﬃcer that prefers one candidate to the other, and
decides on taking the risk of invalidating some of the the valid ballots that are in favor of
her less-preferred candidate, in order to increase the probability of victory of her preferred
candidate. Researchers has been concerned with this possibility for a long time. In his
analysis of voting in the U.S. elections, Harris (1934) writes:
”The use of paper ballots undoubtedly is conducive to voting frauds. The
paper ballots must be counted by hand, frequently requiring several hours or
longer, under conditions late at night which are likely to facilitate frauds. The
election oﬃcers are quite exhausted after the long day at the polls, and are
not ﬁt to carry on the count for hours afterwards. The watchers are likely
to leave if the count lasts for hours, and various short cuts may be used. In
the confusion, poor light, mingling of ballots, etc., it is easy for ballots to be
altered or substituted, and for the count to be falsiﬁed. If the ballot is short
and the count can be completed within a very few hours, these dangers are
not present” (Harris, 1934, pg.380)
Since electoral fraud is an illegal activity, it implies the risk of getting punished if the
illegal action of the election oﬃcer is discovered. Then, the decision problem of the oﬃcer
can be described as follows. Each incremental valid ballot that the oﬃcer invalidates
increases the risk of getting caught. Moreover, it is plausible to assume that this risk
increases more than proportionally with each additional ballot. If the oﬃcer invalidates
just a few valid ballots, the likelihood that the authorities discover this misbehavior are
very low. However, if she invalidates a few more ballots, this likelihoods starts to increase
relatively quickly, as - for instance - the discrepancy of the election outcomes with exit
polls starts to increase.
On the beneﬁt side, the biased oﬃcer wanting to increase the likelihood that her pre-
ferred party wins the election understands that this likelihood is large when the expected
margin of victory of one candidate over the other is slim. Contrarily, when the expected
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invalidated ballots do not contribute to increasing this likelihood. Given that the risk of
getting caught for invalidation does not depend on the expected margin of victory, wider
expected margin of victory implies lower number of invalidations by the biased oﬃcer.
We can thus formulate the following
Hypothesis B1. Higher margin of victory is negatively correlated with the fraction
of invalid ballots.
Hypotheses U1 and B1 give the same predictions. Thus, to discern empirically between
the two theories (unbiased and biased oﬃcers), we need an additional testable hypothesis.
Suppose that diﬀerent districts or regions diﬀer in terms of their social capital. This
has two implications for the behavior of the election oﬃcer. Consider, for instance, the
biased oﬃcer in a region with low social capital. If there is also some personal moral cost
of mis-behavior, this cost probably is correlated with social capital. On the beneﬁt side,
it is also more likely (see Banﬁeld and Banﬁeld 1958) that in regions with lower social
capital, corrupt oﬃcers depend relatively more on the rents generated through the capture
of the electoral process. Both of these channels imply that the relationship between the
expected margin of victory and the number of invalid ballots should be stronger in the
regions with lower social capital.
Hypothesis B2. The negative correlation between the margin of victory and the
fraction of invalid ballots is stronger in districts (or regions) with lower social capital.
2.5 Parties
In all the theories described above, the political parties are passive. However, parties
are likely to act strategically, hoping to inﬂuence the electoral outcome during the vote
count. In particular, given that party representatives are allowed to be present at the
vote counting, and the total number of representatives that each party has is normally
limited, parties are likely to allocate their representatives in districts that give them the
highest expected return.
Clearly, allocating representatives into the districts that are won or lost almost for
sure (i.e. those with wide expected margins of victory) makes little strategic sense. Thus,
parties allocate disproportionately more representatives in districts that are uncertain,
and where even a few votes counted mistakenly might imply winning or losing the par-
10liamentary seat. Then, in a two-party elections, if both parties act similarly, we should
expect that ballots are scrutinized much more closely in the districts with lower victory
margins. For the reasons described in Section 1.2, this would also imply a higher number
of ballots invalidated. We can thus formulate the following
Hypothesis P1. Higher margin of victory is negatively correlated with the fraction
of invalid ballots.
Again, hypotheses U1, B1, and P1 give the same prediction. To distinguish empirically
between these competing theories, we need to consider the number of candidates. Each
party does not typically run for the parliamentary seat in every district. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that a higher number of candidates reﬂects a higher potential number
of party representatives assisting the vote count. Therefore, if the variation in the number
of invalid ballots is driven by the variation in the pressure that party representatives
put on election oﬃcers, we should observe a positive correlation between the number of
candidates and the fraction of invalid ballots.
Hypothesis P2. Higher number of candidates is positively correlated with the fraction
of invalid ballots.
Table 1 summarizes the empirical predictions of the competing theories.
3 Italian Electoral System in 1994-2001
In this section, we describe the political and institutional context from which our data
comes. We analyze electoral data from the three Italian parliamentary elections (1994,
1996, and 2001) that were based on a majoritarian system. We restrict our dataset for this
period because these elections exhibit a natural measure of the closeness of the electoral
competition: the margin of victory between the ﬁrst and the second candidate.
For three legislatures, the ones that started in 1994, 1996, and 2001, Italian citizens
elected their representatives using a two-tier system (75 percent of representatives via the
majoritarian system and the remaining 25 percent via the proportional system). Before
1994 and after 2001 the entire Italian electoral system was proportional. We use data on
the elections of the lower chamber of the Parliament, i.e. the House of Representatives
(Camera dei Deputati).
On election day, each voter received two ballots: one to cast a vote for a candidate in
11her single-member district, and another to cast a vote for a party list in her larger pro-
portional district. Figure 2 shows a typical ballot, for the majoritarian and proportional-
representation systems in Italy. In the districts with the majoritarian system, the voter
has to put a cross on the name of the candidate of her preference, whereas in the districts
under the PR system, she has to put a cross on the party/coalition symbol.
475 out of the 630 House members were elected in single-member majoritarian-election
districts, while the rest was elected from closed party lists in 26 multiple-member districts
(with 2 to 12 seats per district).3 We focus on these 475 majoritarian-election single-
member districts.
To understand the variation in invalid ballots across the Parliamentary districts, one
ﬁrst needs to know how the polling stations operate. Elections take place on Sunday
between 8 AM and 10 PM, and on Monday between 7 AM and 3 PM. As soon as the
elections end (i.e. Monday afternoon), election oﬃcers start counting the ballots. The
counts typically last uninterrupted until Tuesday morning.
Each polling station has 3 types of election oﬃcers: the president of the polling station,
a secretary, and four canvassers.4 Party list representatives, at most two for each list, can
also participate at the vote count. At least three election oﬃcers, including the president
or the vice-president (chosen by the president among the canvassers), have to be present
through the entire count. The president of the polling station decides (after consulting
the canvassers) on the outcome of any disputes related to the vote count, including those
about the validity of a ballot. She then registers her provisional decision (the Parliament
has the last word about oﬃcial protests). The secretary keeps the oﬃcial record about all
the electoral activities. At the end of the counting all members of the polling stations sign
the record. Both the election oﬃcers and party list representatives can contest ballots,
i.e. question the validity of the count of particular votes.
Delegates of the party list can nominate two party-list representatives for each polling
station. Representatives are allowed to be present during the whole electoral process
and to add comments into the oﬃcial record. Until 2004 they were also allowed to keep
3For the Senate (Senato) elections, instead, voters received only one ballot to cast their vote for
a candidate in a single-member district, and the non-elected candidates with the highest numbers of
votes in the 232 majoritarian districts were later assigned to the remaining 83 seats according to the
proportional-representation rule.
4See Article 34 of the Electoral Law (Testo unico delle leggi per l’elezione della Camera dei deputati),
approved with the Decree of the President of the Republic on 30 March 1957 (No. 361).
12track of voters. When working in the polling stations election oﬃcers receive a monetary
compensation of approximately 100 euros. Moreover, both election oﬃcers and party
representatives are compensated by their employers with (at most) 3 days of paid leave.
The polling starts with signing and stamping of ballots by the election oﬃcers. After
all voters cast their ballots, election oﬃcers start counting the ballots, one by one. Voters
are instructed to put just one sign on each ballot (and no other mark). The rationale
for this is to keep the votes secret. Any sign that is diﬀerent from a simple “x” could
represent a signal about the vote. These additional signs (made by mistake or, sometimes,
on purpose) represent the major reason for ballot invalidation.
4 Data
We extracted information on three majoritarian parliamentary elections from the Atlante
Storico-Elettorale d’Italia (Corbetta and Piretti, 2008). An observation in our dataset
represents the smallest level of aggregation of polling stations available, that is the smallest
unit between a municipality and a district. We deﬁne these as electoral units.
Italy is divided into 475 electoral districts, which roughly reﬂect the population density.
Larger cities have several districts: for instance, the municipality of Rome has 24 and the
municipality of Milan has 11. Often, several municipalities (there are more than 8,000)
belong to the same district.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the key variables used in our empirical
analysis. Overall, our dataset contains 23,126 geographical units (by year) observations.
26.3 percent (9,782 observations) are located in the Southern regions (Molise, Campania,
Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily, and Sardinia). The main two coalitions lead the
electoral competition in most geographical units (38 percent the center-right one and
36.2 percent the center-left one). We observe a strong party incumbency eﬀect: in 94.4
per cent of cases, the incumbent coalition leads the competition. Regarding incumbent
politicians, the picture is somewhat diﬀerent: in 46.5 percent of cases the voting ballot
contains the name of the incumbent politician, and in more than half of such cases (or
in 26.4 percent of the total), the incumbent politician leads. The number of candidates
vary across districts. On average, a voter is confronted to a ballot with 4.14 candidates.
Turnout rate is relatively high (which has been a traditional characteristic of Italian
13elections): in a typical district, 82 percent of all eligible voters participate.
Our main variable of interest, i.e. ballots reported as invalid, represent a relatively
small but nevertheless non-negligible fraction of votes. On average, in a typical district
or town, 3.9 percent of all the ballots is reported as invalid. We also see that there is
substantial variation in this measure: the standard deviation is 2.2 percent. In 66 units
there are zero invalid ballots, while the highest number in our dataset is 57 percent.
Figure 3 and Table 4 indicate that the fraction of invalid ballots varies substantially
both across space and time. Southern regions exhibit the highest levels of invalid ballots,
followed by the North-West. The Northern and Cental regions exhibit the lowest levels
of invalid ballots. The variability across time will allow us to control for unobserved
time-invariant characteristics of our electoral units.
Table 2 shows that blank ballots represent a somewhat higher fraction of total votes
(as compared to invalid ballots): in a typical district/town, 4.6 percent of ballots are
blank. As discussed above, we will use this measure as a proxy for citizens’ protest.
The average leading margin (i.e. the vote diﬀerence between the winning party/coalition
and the party/coalition that arrived second) is 18.4 per cent. The variation in the margin
of victory is substantial (14.8 percentage points). The district with the closest election in
our dataset exhibits a vote diﬀerence of basically zero percent, whereas in the one with
the largest margin, the winning candidate leads by 96.1 percent.
Figure 4 presents graphically the relationship between the margin of victory of the
winning party (coalition) and the fraction of ballots reported as invalid (in the total
number of ballots), for the entire country. Each point marked with a dot on the graph
represents the fraction of invalid ballots for a given percentile of the margin of victory. For
the levels of margin of victory that are close to zero, the fraction of invalid ballots varies
between 4 and 4.5 percent. For margins of victory in the neighborhood of 40 percent
(i.e. a landslide victory) the fraction of invalid ballots is slightly larger than 3 percent.
The two largest percentiles of the margin of victory (65 and 95 percent) have the two
lowest fraction of invalid ballots (around 2.5 percent). Overall, there is a clear negative
correlation between the two variables: the larger is the margin of victory, the smaller is
the fraction of invalid ballots.
Comparing Southern and non-Southern regions reveals a remarkable regional diﬀerence
(see Figures 5 and 6). In the South, there is no correlation between the margin of victory
14and the fraction of invalid ballots, whereas in the non-Southern regions, the negative
correlation is extremely clear.
Table 4 describes the diﬀerences in the key variables between Southern and non-
Southern regions. Consistent with Figure 3, we observe that districts in the South have
a higher fraction of invalid ballots (3.3 percent versus 4.7 percent). The diﬀerences in
blank ballots are similar. Turnout is substantially higher in the non-Southern regions
(86.4 versus 75.9 percent). Right-wing coalition does comparatively better in the non-
Southern regions, whereas the stronghold of the left-wing coalition seems to be in the
South. Incumbent party leads more often in the North. However, concerning the behavior
and performance of incumbent politicians, the opposite is true: incumbent politicians
participate more in the South (the likelihood of incumbent politician leading is thus
proportionally similar across the two parts of the country). Elections seem to be more
competitive in the South: average margin of victory in the South is 15.9 per cent, whereas
in the North it is 20.2 percent.
5 Empirical Speciﬁcation and Results
Next, we proceed to test empirically the competing theories that we have described above.
Our empirical speciﬁcation is as follows:
logn
v = a + b1 logd
e + b2 logn + b3 logn
b + c1N + c2X + e, (1)
where nv denotes the fraction of invalid ballots, de is the realized leading margin of the ﬁrst
candidate over the second (which serves as a proxy for the expected margin of victory), n
is the total number of ballots (which corresponds to the turnout level), nb is the fraction of
blank ballots, X is the vector of other controls that we will use to evaluate the robustness
of the results and e is the error term, which we assume to be normally distributed with
zero mean and constant variance.
Column 1 in Table 5 shows the estimated coeﬃcient in a regression (in logs) of the
fraction of invalid ballots with the leading margin as the only explanatory variable. This
elasticity is equal to -7.6 percent.5 This implies that one standard deviation increase in
5The seemingly low elasticity is driven by the standard deviation of invalid votes being 10 times smaller
than the standard deviation of the leading margin.
15the leading margin reduces the fraction of invalid votes by 0.25 of a standard deviation,
i.e. a quantitatively large eﬀect.
The coeﬃcient on the leading margin is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at 1%
level. This means that in the municipalities/districts where the electoral competition
is weaker, the fraction of invalid ballots is lower. This coeﬃcient remains negative and
signiﬁcant at 1% level in all the speciﬁcations of Table 5. Thus, we ﬁnd support for the
hypotheses U1, B1, and P1, and the data rules against the hypotheses V and VP1. In
other words, we do not ﬁnd support for the theory that voters increase their attention (and
thus are less likely to submit invalid ballots) when the electoral competition intensiﬁes,
and neither can we support the theory that the increasing voter protest when the electoral
competition is weakened drives up the fraction of invalid ballots.
As discussed in the theoretical section, several other variables might inﬂuence the
number of invalid ballots. In Column 2, we report the results of a regression in which we
additionally control for turnout, the fraction of blank ballots, and the number of candi-
dates. Blank ballots - which plausible captures to some extent the level of voters’ protest
- is positively correlated with the fraction of invalid ballots and, across all speciﬁcations,
the elasticity is approximately one-fourth. The coeﬃcient on the margin of victory re-
mains negative and signiﬁcant, implying that even when we account for the protest votes,
the electoral competition still has an eﬀect on invalid ballots.
We ﬁnd that turnout is strongly negatively correlated with the fraction of invalid
ballots. This gives support for the hypothesis U2. However, given that the elections in
the South have historically both a higher fraction of invalid ballots and a lower turnout,
we run an alternative regression (whose results are reported in Column 3), which includes
the South dummy. Once we control for the North-South diﬀerence in invalid ballots, the
correlation between turnout and the fraction of invalid ballots decreases from -0.69 to
-0.28. This indicates that a part of the correlation is purely driven by some characteristic
of the Southern politics. Nevertheless, the gradient on the leading margin remains highly
signiﬁcant and does not decrease substantially in size. In the regression of Column 3 we
have also added year dummies. We observe that, as compared to the 1994 elections, the
fraction of invalid ballots in the 1996 elections increased substantially, whereas we ﬁnd no
such diﬀerence in the 2001 elections.
Next, we address the question whether the political outcome can predict the fraction
16of invalid votes. The results of this analysis are reported in Columns 4 and 5. The ﬁndings
in Column 4 suggest that the victory of the incumbent party does not aﬀect the fraction
of invalid ballots.6 Whether the leading party is right or left-wing also has no impact on
the number of invalid ballots (Column 5).
The electoral-competition gradient shown in Table 5 is the average eﬀect of more
intense electoral competition on the number of invalid ballots. The next step in our
analysis is t reﬁne this ﬁnding by exploring the determinants of this gradient. We report
our ﬁndings in Table 6. Column 1 indicates that the gradient becomes steeper when
turnout increases, and that this eﬀect is robust (see Column 4) to allowing the slope to
diﬀer between the districts in the Southern and the non-Southern regions, as well as in
terms of the number of candidates running for the election. In Column 2, we see that
the gradient is weaker in the Southern districts. Given that the values of social-capital
measures for Southern Italy are signiﬁcantly lower than those for the Northern and Central
Italy (see Putnam, 1993; Guiso et al., 2004), this implies that we ﬁnd no support for the
theoretical hypothesis B2. Column 3 shows that the gradient becomes smaller as the
number of candidates (and subsequently that of party representatives) increases. If the
hypothesis P1 were valid, we would observe that in close races the number of invalid
votes increases with the number of party representatives. Our ﬁndings cast doubts on
the validity of the hypothesis P1. The leadership of the incumbent party also does not
aﬀect the gradient.7
Several further results are worth mentioning. First, controlling for all the interactions,
we see that turnout is the main driver behind the diﬀerential gradient between the South
and the North. Second, once we control for the interaction of turnout and the margin
of victory, the number of candidates ceases to be correlated with the fraction of invalid
ballots. Finally, the last column shows that controlling for turnout at national referenda
at the province level (which is a frequently used measure of social capital), the absolute
value of the coeﬃcient on turnout in the majoritarian race decreases substantially and
loses its statistical signiﬁcance. We interpret this as a sign that the gradient depends on
the level of civic duty of election oﬃcers, which is correlated with the overall level of social
6The regression of Column 4 is done with data only from the years 1996 and 2001, given that there is
no information on party incumbency for the 1994 elections (the ﬁrst year of majoritarian elections).
7We do not report this result, to economize on space. The complete regression table is available upon
request.
17capital at the province level.
Table 7 reports the results of regressions in which we have added as controls the
electoral-unit and the leading-candidate ﬁxed eﬀects. Our aim in this is to verify whether
the leading-margin gradient that we have identiﬁed above is not just driven by some
time-invariant electoral unit (in particular, municipality) characteristic, implying that
that some units had closer races than others in all the three elections (and, at the same
time, higher fractions of invalid votes). Controlling for more than 8000 electoral-unit
ﬁxed eﬀects identiﬁes the leading-margin elasticity of the fraction of invalid ballot within
electoral units over time. The elasticity decreases from -5 percent to -2.8 percent (and
the coeﬃcient remains statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level). While the coeﬃcient on blank
ballots remains basically unchanged, the coeﬃcient on voter turnout loses its signiﬁcance.
A likely cause is the fact that voter turnout is a relatively stable characteristic and varies
relatively little over time within municipality. Column 2 shows that even controlling for
electoral-unit ﬁxed eﬀects, the interaction between the margin of victory and voter turnout
remains highly signiﬁcant. In Columns 3 and 4 we control for individual leading-candidate
ﬁxed eﬀects. Controlling for leading-candidate ﬁxed eﬀects does not alter the result on
the margin of victory (with respect to the results of regression with the electoral-unit
ﬁxed eﬀects). This suggests that the elasticity of the margin of victory is robust to the
inclusion of candidate characteristics.
Table 8 addresses the North-South divide that we observe in descriptive statistics and
ﬁgures. The ﬁrst column replicates the results from Column 3 of Table 5, i.e. a simple
OLS regression with a dummy for the South. The coeﬃcient on the South dummy is
what we will try to explain by adding province-level information on economic outcomes
in Column 2, measures of social trust in Column 3 and an index for the presence of
organized crime in the Columns 4 and 5. The elasticity with respect to the employment
rate is always negative, highly signiﬁcant, and close to -1, while that with respect to
income per capita is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. Among the several measures of
social capital that we employ (we do not report all the regression results, to economize
on space), the one that relates strongest to invalid ballots is the turnout at national
referenda. The elasticity of invalid ballots with respect to this measure is negative, large
(in absolute value), and statistically signiﬁcant. Adding this single proxy for civic duty
lowers the coeﬃcient on the South dummy from 19 to 8 percent, and the coeﬃcient loses
18its signiﬁcance. This suggests that civic duty captures most of the ”South eﬀect”. The
other frequently used measures of social capital (the presence of voluntary associations,
blood donations, the percentage of diﬀerential waste) have no power in explaining the
variation in invalid ballots.
Organized crime is known to be heavily present in most Southern regions. The
Camorra around Naples, the Maﬁa in Sicily, the ’Ndrangheta in Calabria and the Sacra
Corona Unita in Puglia regularly try to inﬂuence local and national politics, directly and
indirectly. Vote buying would certainly be an instrument to manipulate elections, and
adding particular signs on the ballots would be one way for voters to signal their voted
preference. If this were the case, and some of these votes were invalidated, we would
expect this to show up in our data.
In Column 4, we report the results of the regression in which we additionally control
for the presence of organized crime. We have constructed this index in the following way.
We calculated the province-level average of the (standardized) value of the number of
principal crime types and of the standard deviation of these crime types. Our aim is
to capture not simply the level of crime but also its variation over time (given that the
most successful maﬁa organizations use threats of violence - and not actual violence -
to advance their objectives). The types of crime that we use are: homicides accounted
for by maﬁa, extortions, kidnappings, and criminal organization (associazione maﬁosa).
Next, we normalize this average in such a way that all the values lie between 0 and 1.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of the maﬁa index at the region level. Compared to the
least maﬁa-infested province (Vicenza), the most infested one (Reggio Calabria) has 18
per cent more of invalid votes. Column 5 shows that this eﬀect is robust to the inclusion
of region dummies. This means that even within regions, at the districts in the provinces
where maﬁa is more present the fraction of invalid votes is larger.
We also ran a regression adding as a regressor the interaction between the maﬁa index
and the leading-margin (results not reported here; available upon request). We found no
evidence of a diﬀerential gradient depending on the presence of maﬁa. This implies that
the presence of organized crime might only increase the number of protest votes, without
actively inﬂuencing the electoral count.
Once the lower level of social capital and the higher level of organized crime are
accounted for, the political behavior in terms of the level of invalid ballots does not seem
19to diﬀer between the districts in the Southern and non-Southern regions.
6 Conclusion
We study how the closeness of electoral race aﬀects the number of invalid ballots, under the
traditional paper-ballot voting technology. We discuss several competing theories that can
explain this correlation: based on the behavior of voters, on biased and unbiased election
oﬃcers, and on the political parties. Using a large dataset from the Italian parliamentary
elections in 1994-2001, we try to disentangle these competing theories.
Our ﬁrst major ﬁnding is establishing a strong, robust positive correlation between
the closeness of electoral race and the fraction of invalid ballots. We ﬁnd no evidence that
this correlation is driven by voters’ behavior or the biased actions of election oﬃcers. The
theory that garners most support is that of unbiased election oﬃcers that allocate their
eﬀort to reduce the likelihood of incorrectly adjudicating the victory.
Second, we ﬁnd a large North-South gap in the fraction of invalid ballots: electoral
districts and municipalities in Southern Italian regions have a substantially higher level of
invalid ballots. Moreover, the link between the closeness of electoral race and the fraction
of invalid ballots seems absent in the South. The low level of social capital and high level
of organized crime explain these diﬀerences: once these two features are accounted for,
the districts and municipalities in the South behave similarly to those in the North.
What do our ﬁndings imply? Considered together with the results of Ansolabehere and Stewart III
(2005), they suggests that the traditional paper-based ballot system performs better than
other systems, in terms of the reliability and resistance to errors. Ansolabehere and Stewart III
(2005) ﬁnd that the paper-based system exhibits the lowest rate of uncounted votes. We
show that the paper-based system seems to have an ’automatic safety control’ that in-
creases the likelihood that the victor is announced correctly. This system functions thanks
to the increased attention that the counting oﬃcers allocate to tracking the truly invalid
ballots when the electoral race becomes closer.
However, we also ﬁnd that this ’safety control’ system functions only in the areas
with suﬃciently high levels of social capital. This implies that social capital is im-
portant not only for the participatory behavior of voters (as noted by Putnam 1993
and Alesina and Giuliano 2009) and the quality of the political class (as discussed by
20Caselli and Morelli 2004), but also for the political players, such as election oﬃcers, that
oversee the correct functioning of the representative democracy.
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Figure 1: Fraction of Invalid Ballots Around the World (IDEA)
NOTE.– Countries are divided into 9 percentiles. The data comes from the Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance and refers to the parliamentary elections.










Figure 3: Geographical Distribution of Invalid Ballots
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Figure 7: The Maﬁa Index
29Table 1: Theoretical Hypotheses
Theory Correlation between the fraction of invalid ballots and:
Margin of victory Turnout Number of candi-
dates
Voters positive - -
Protest positive - negative









Parties negative - positive
Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
South 0.263 0.44 23126
Center 0.16 0.367 23126
Right coalition leads 0.38 0.485 23126
Left coalition leads 0.362 0.481 23126
Incumbent party leads 0.944 0.23 15026
Invalid ballots 0.039 0.022 23126
Blank ballots 0.046 0.022 23126
Number of candidates 4.136 1.005 23126
Turnout 0.820 0.109 23126
Leading margin 0.184 0.148 23126
30Table 3: Fraction of Invalid Ballots by Re-
gion and Over Time
Region 1994 1996 2001
Abruzzo 3.7% 4.7% 3.2%
Emilia-Romagna 2.2 2.6 2.4
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 3.0 3.9 4.4
Lazio 4.1 4.3 3.3
Liguria 3.9 4.6 3.5
Lombardia 2.2 2.8 3.5
Marche 3.3 3.8 2.9
Piemonte 3.6 4.1 4.1
Toscana 2.9 3.5 2.8
Trentino-Alto Adige 3.5 3.8 3.5
Umbria 3.4 3.3 2.8
Valle d’Aosta 3.9 4.9 5.4
Veneto 2.6 2.8 3.2
North 3.0 3.5 3.5
Basilicata 8.5 8.0 5.0
Calabria 6.0 6.2 4.3
Campania 4.3 4.5 3.2
Molise 4.8 6.1 3.9
Puglia 5.2 5.3 3.6
Sardegna 5.3 5.9 3.5
Sicilia 7.8 8.5 6.6
South 5.8 6.1 4.3
31Table 4: North-South Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
North Italy South Italy
Right coalition leads 0.470 0.499 0.257 0.437
Left coalition leads 0.248 0.432 0.517 0.500
Incumbent party leads 0.952 0.213 0.918 0.275
Incumbent participates 0.397 0.489 0.563 0.496
Incumbent leads 0.232 0.422 0.311 0.463
Invalid ballots 0.033 0.015 0.047 0.026
Blank ballots 0.040 0.018 0.055 0.025
Number of candidates 3.954 0.831 4.383 1.157
Turnout 0.864 0.073 0.759 0.119
Leading margin 0.202 0.161 0.159 0.125
N 13344 9782
NOTE.– The variables about the incumbent have 8,848 observations in North and
6,178 in the South.
32Table 5: Log-Fraction of Invalid Ballots Regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log-Invalid ballots
log-Leading margin -0.076*** -0.066*** -0.051*** -0.034*** -0.051***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
log-Turnout -0.692*** -0.279*** -0.286*** -0.279***
(0.096) (0.071) (0.073) (0.071)
log-Blank ballots 0.287*** 0.239*** 0.193*** 0.239***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Log-N. of candidates -0.065* -0.069 -0.056 -0.069
(0.034) (0.049) (0.055) (0.049)
South 0.318*** 0.226*** 0.318***
(0.034) (0.036) (0.035)
Year 1996 0.114*** 0.096*** 0.114***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Year 2001 0.020 0.016
(0.020) (0.020)
Incumbent party leads -0.004
(0.024)
Right coalition leads -0.005
(0.020)
Observations 23003 22982 22982 14914 22982
R-squared 0.031 0.180 0.246 0.164 0.246
NOTE.– Standard errors are clustered at the district level. There are 475 majoritarian districts.
33Table 6: Log-Fraction of Invalid Ballots Regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log-Invalid ballots
log-Leading margin -0.077*** -0.062*** -0.121*** -0.116***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.027) (0.028)
log-Turnout -0.278*** -0.271*** -0.280*** -0.275***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
log-Blank ballots 0.239*** 0.240*** 0.240*** 0.240***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Log-N. of candidates -0.068 -0.067 -0.069 -0.067
(0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.049)
South 0.317*** 0.323*** 0.322*** 0.322***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Year 1996 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.112*** 0.103***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
Year 2001 0.015 0.015 0.020 0.014






Log-N. of candidates 0.051*** 0.030
(0.019) (0.020)
Observations 22982 22982 22982 22982
R-squared 0.248 0.248 0.247 0.248
NOTE.– Standard errors are clustered at the district level. There are 475 majoritarian districts.
34Table 7: Log-Fraction of Invalid Ballots Fixed Eﬀects Regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log-Invalid ballots
log-Leading margin -0.028*** -0.006 -0.026*** -0.043**
(0.004) (0.024) (0.003) (0.017)
log-Turnout -0.253 -0.262 0.044 0.046
(0.239) (0.239) (0.050) (0.050)
log-Blank ballots 0.262*** 0.262*** 0.212*** 0.212***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.012) (0.012)
Log-N. of candidates -0.052 -0.051 1.426 1.403
(0.046) (0.046) (2.323) (2.339)
Year 1996 0.134*** 0.132***
(0.021) (0.021)







Log-N. of candidates -0.029* 0.011
(0.017) (0.013)
Electoral unit ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes no no
Leading candidate ﬁxed eﬀects no no yes yes
Observations 22982 22982 22982 22982
R-squared 0.738 0.739 0.568 0.569
NOTE.– Standard errors are clustered at the district level. There are 475 majoritarian districts. There
are 8,224 electoral units ﬁxed eﬀects, 2,476 leading candidate times year ﬁxed eﬀects, and 3,335 pair
times year ﬁxed eﬀects.
35Table 8: Explaining the North-South Divide in the Log-Fraction of Invalid Ballots.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log-Invalid ballots
log-Margin of leadership -0.051*** -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.046***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
log-Turnout -0.279*** -0.232*** -0.087 -0.081 -0.079 -0.007
(0.071) (0.069) (0.073) (0.073) (0.078) (0.057)
log-Blank ballots 0.239*** 0.219*** 0.216*** 0.208*** 0.207*** 0.220***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015)
Log-N. of candidates -0.069 -0.053 -0.054 -0.046 -0.056 -0.049
(0.049) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.036)
South 0.318*** 0.189*** 0.078 0.061 0.070
(0.034) (0.050) (0.061) (0.059) (0.058)
D1996 0.114*** 0.119*** 0.121*** 0.125*** 0.121*** 0.139***
(0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
D2001 0.020 0.015 0.020 0.021 0.013 0.032
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
log-GDP per capita 0.036 0.155 0.128 0.288** -0.041
(0.114) (0.114) (0.123) (0.120) (0.110)
Maﬁa index 0.184* 0.201***
(0.110) (0.064)
log-Employment rate -1.138*** -1.074*** -0.925*** -1.171*** -0.514**
(0.212) (0.211) (0.232) (0.236) (0.251)
log-Recreation associations 0.182 -0.098 -0.371**
(0.232) (0.257) (0.189)
log-Volontary work associations -0.092 0.155 0.300
(0.238) (0.261) (0.192)
log-Percentage of diﬀerential waste -0.039 -0.060** 0.013
(0.025) (0.025) (0.027)
log-blood donations 0.031 0.040* -0.034
(0.020) (0.020) (0.024)
log-Turnout in National Referenda -0.774*** -0.888*** -0.832*** -0.459**
(0.200) (0.202) (0.227) (0.180)
Region ﬁxed eﬀects No No No No No Yes
Observations 22982 21594 21594 21594 20425 20425
R-squared 0.246 0.275 0.283 0.289 0.301 0.379
NOTE.– Standard errors are clustered at the district level. There are 475 majoritarian districts.
367 Apppendix
In this Appendix, we construct a simple formal rational-choice model of the behavior of
an unbiased returning oﬃcer, along the lines of the argument developed in Section 2.3.
The oﬃcer’s objective function is to maximize her utility, which consists of two terms.
The ﬁrst term captures the fact that she wants to reduce the risk of jeopardizing the
true outcome of the elections. The probability of this event depends negatively on the
eﬀort exerted by the oﬃcer when scrutinizing the ballots. The second term represents the
standard convex cost of eﬀort.
Let’s denote with n the number of true invalid ballots. Faced with a ballot (valid or
invalid), the oﬃcer might commit one of the two type of errors. Type I error consists in
invalidating a valid ballot. Type II error consists in counting as valid a ballot which is
truly invalid. Given that the type I error is very unlikely to happen (one can hardly spot
an inexistent irregularity in a ballot correctly ﬁlled by the voter), we will assume these
errors away. Instead, the type II error, i.e. missing an existing irregularity, is much more
important and the probability of this error is aﬀected by the eﬀort that the oﬃcer exerts.
Let’s denote this probability with p.
These type-II errors might jeopardize the true outcome of the elections if they are
suﬃciently numerous as compared to the diﬀerence in the number of valid votes between
the two candidates with the highest number of votes. Let’s denote with d and de the
true and the expected diﬀerence in the number of valid votes between the two candidates,
respectively. Let’s assume, moreover, that
d = d
eε, (2)











Then, the problem of the oﬃcer can thus be written as:
max
x U = −Pr[np(x) > d] − c(x,α), (4)
where α is the parameter that captures the election-speciﬁc objective diﬃculty of scrutiniz-
ing the ballots (for instance, it is higher in a district with a larger number of candidates).





denp(x) − c(x,α). (5)




0 (x) = cx(x,α). (6)
The left-hand side is the marginal beneﬁt of eﬀort, measured in terms of reduced risk













less miscounted ballots. The lower is the expected vote diﬀerence between
the two candidates with the highest number of votes (lower de) and the higher is the
precision of the estimate of the vote diﬀerence (higher φ), the higher is the eﬀect of this
reduction in miscounted ballots on the risk of jeopardizing the true election outcome. The
right-hand side simply represents the increasing marginal cost of eﬀort.













Higher number of truly invalid ballots and a higher precision of the estimate of the vote
diﬀerence increase the eﬀort of the oﬃcer. Higher expected vote diﬀerence and the steeper
increase in the cost of eﬀort reduce the eﬀort of the oﬃcer.
In order to get closed form solutions for x∗have a tractable empirical speciﬁcation we
assume that p(x) has the shape of the exponential cumulative distribution 1 − eλx, with
λ > 0, and that the cost function has the shape of an exponential function c(x,α) = eαx−1,
with α > 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that α > λ. The shape of these
functions is ideal, as it captures the decreasing returns to eﬀort for the probability of
committing type II errors, and the more than proportional cost of eﬀort. With these















38Empirically, we do not observe the oﬃcer’s eﬀort, but only the number of ballots
reported as invalid. In terms of our model, denoting this number as nv, we get
n














v = logn + λx









= a + b1 logd
e + b2 logn + e, (10)
where a = −
λ
α−λ logα, b1 = −
λ
α−λ, and b2 =
α
α−λ, and e is an unobserved component
equal to λ
α−λ logφ.
This result allow us to formulate the following testable hypotheses.
Hypothesis A1. Higher vote diﬀerence (between the two candidates with the higher
number of votes) negatively correlates with the number of reported invalid ballots, b1 =
− λ
α−λ < 0.
Hypothesis A2. Higher number of invalid votes positively correlates with the “true”
number of reported invalid ballots, b2 = α
α−λ > 0.
Finally, note that when α is large (i.e. when the cost function is steeper) the number
of invalid votes decreases.
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